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The philosophy of psychiatry 
and psychopathology
There is no clear line between philosophy and science. 
Where there are no fixed boundaries only the 
timid never risk trespass. 
(Davidson, 1980, p. 113)
The philosophy of psychiatry is an interdisciplinary field that brings together philosophers, 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and the like to explore conceptual and explanatory issues in psychiatry. 
These issues pertain to three main families of discussion that may be discerned (Murphy, 2015) and 
which illuminate why each issue is of philosophical interest and import.
First, there are topics that emerge when we treat psychiatry as a special science and deal 
with it using the methods and concepts of general philosophy of science. Psychiatry offers 
its own challenges to age-old problems in philosophy of science, such as explanation (e.g., 
whether mental disorders are amenable to mechanistic explanation), reduction (e.g., wheth-
er mental disorders are to be explained at a molecular level), and classification (e.g., whether 
mental disorders are natural kinds). The examination of these issues is all the more import-
ant because of the fact that psychiatry is a science still in its infancy, meaning that arriving 
at a proper theory of explanation and classification may be instrumental to the progress of 
psychiatric research (Murphy, 2006).
Second, there are conceptual issues that emerge when we try to understand what mental 
disorders are. These begin with the attempt to arrive at a definition of mental disorder, which is 
an ongoing task (Wakefield, 1992). It is still an open question whether and to what extent mental 
disorder represents the pathologizing of normal “problems in living” (Szasz, 1961). Assuming that 
there is a line between the normal and the pathological, we are still left with a myriad questions 
(all of which are dependent on where we draw that line) such as ethical (e.g., whether and to what 
extent patients are autonomous and morally responsible for their behavior) and experiential ones 
(e.g., whether and how the self-experience of patients is affected by interacting with the labels 
that are attached to them). Of course, this is only a diminutive sample as there are many other 
dimensions to mental disorders.
Third, there are interactions between psychopathology and philosophy. On the one hand, 
philosophers have used clinical phenomena to illuminate issues in both the philosophy of mind 
and epistemology. On the other hand, they have used philosophy of mind and epistemology to 
illuminate the nature of mental disorder. In doing “applied philosophy of mind” (Graham and 
Stephens, 1994), some philosophers incorporate empirical results into philosophical reflection on 
topics like personal identity, rationality, and the nature of belief (Bortolotti, 2009), while others 
build distinctively philosophical explorations of particular disorders, which try to understand 
them in terms borrowed from the philosophy of mind (Graham and Stephens, 2000).
Although none of the following essays is easy to pigeonhole, I believe it is safe to say that all 
three families of discussion are represented in this dossier.
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In Can jinn be a tonic? The therapeutic value of spirit-relat-
ed beliefs, practices and experiences, Anastasia Philippa Scrut-
ton provides a philosophical basis for the idea that pathology 
emerges in anomalous experiences as a result of responsive 
and contextual factors, and defends this claim against the 
alternative idea that pathology is inherent in all, or some, 
anomalous experiences, regardless of the context or culture in 
which they are interpreted. She argues that negative assump-
tions about spirit-related practices, beliefs and experiences 
(SPBEs) in the West are problematic, both because they er-
roneously extrapolate aspects of some SPBEs to all of them, 
and because they discourage people from SPBEs and so shut 
down a potentially therapeutic avenue. Scrutton thus suggests 
that western society might have something to learn from cer-
tain SPBEs with respect to anomalous experiences and other 
forms of human experience.
In Cultural syndromes: socially learned but real, Marion 
Godman proposes that culture-bound syndromes are cul-
turally sanctioned responses to overwhelming negative emo-
tions. She explores how tools from cultural evolution theory 
can be employed in understanding how the syndromes are 
relatively confined to and retained within particular cultures. 
In proposing a prominent role of cultural narratives and so-
cial endorsement in culture-bound syndromes, she neverthe-
less argues that such an account steers clear of some of the 
anti-realist trappings associated with social constructivism. 
While agreeing with some constructivist insights about belief 
dependency and the possibility of feedback loops, Godman 
argues that that framework is impoverished as a general mod-
el for explaining cultural syndromes.
In Depressive delusions, Magdalena Antrobus and Lisa 
Bortolotti provide the first philosophical treatment of 
mood-congruent delusions in depression, asking what de-
pressive delusions are and whether they have the potential for 
psychological and epistemic benefits. They argue that depres-
sive delusions emerge as a result of the attempt to eliminate 
the inconsistency between self-schemata formed as a biased 
process of learning, and new conflicting information. Due to 
their reducing dissonance and providing the basis for a unified 
narrative self, Antrobus and Bortolotti argue that depressive 
delusions have the potential to deliver both psychological and 
epistemic benefits by relieving dissonance-induced anxiety 
and preserving a coherent self-concept. However, in the long 
run, their distressing content causes serious psychological 
harm, and the mounting evidence against the self-schemata 
they are designed to preserve compromises the person’s deli-
cate cognitive balance.
In The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delu-
sions, Pablo López-Silva examines the question concerning the 
specific type of mental state that grounds a delusional report. 
After formulating the problem and introducing the common-
sense view that delusions are beliefs, he surveys four of the 
main counter-arguments against that view. Each of these are 
derived from alleged features of delusions that are supposed-
ly not stereotypical of beliefs, e.g. delusions are reported with 
variable degrees of subjective certainty; delusions are not re-
sponsive to counter-evidence; delusions are not integrated 
with other beliefs of the subject; and delusions do not guide 
specific actions of the subjects that hold them. After counter-
ing these objections, López-Silva concludes that the anti-dox-
astic argumentation offers no good reasons to abandon the 
doxastic model and that this model does not need to appeal to 
external resources to reply to such counter-arguments.
Finally, in Delusion as a folk-psychological kind, I pro-
pose that the clinical category of delusion is not appro-
priately conceptualized as a natural kind. After delineat-
ing five different senses of kindhood and introducing a 
non-essentialist approach to natural kindhood, I draw on 
a cognitive model of the intuitive detection and attribu-
tion of mental disorder to suggest that the clinical catego-
ry of delusion is rooted in folk-psychological expectations. 
However, being that the folk-psychological status of delu-
sion does not immediately remove the possibility of this 
kind being vindicated as natural by scientific investigation, 
I formulate a working hypothesis that I claim is both on-
tologically and methodologically more sound, namely, that 
along with the general category of delusion, some delusions 
will be confined to practical kindhood, perhaps along with 
the bulk of mental symptoms and disorders, while some 
will turn out to be objective distinctions in nature.
Each in their own way, the five essays that make up this 
dossier exemplify a welcome metaphilosophical trend that is 
perhaps inherent in philosophy of psychiatry as a discipline 
but which nonetheless is visibly growing in the last few years. 
They all take to heart Susan Haack’s admonition that we 
should learn to disregard the boundaries of this or that arti-
ficial “area” (or, indeed, this or that discipline) and simply fol-
low the questions we are trying to answer wherever they lead 
(Carrier, 2012). Moreover, these contributions demonstrate 
that the collaboration between philosophy and cognitive sci-
ence in general (and psychiatry in particular) is, at its best, a 
two-way street. Philosophy stands to gain because cognitive 
science offers a wealth of concrete (as opposed to imaginary) 
examples with which to test their theories about the mind. In 
turn, cognitive science stands to gain from the employment 
of philosophical analysis through the clarification of concepts, 
the analysis of empirical results, and, in the best case scenario, 
the assessment of the relationship between data and interpre-
tation in order to foster a critical attitude towards scientific 
methodologies and inspire progress (Bortolotti, 2009).
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